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Abstract 
 
Ethnic networks—as proxies for information networks—have been associated with higher levels 
of  international trade.  Previous research has not differentiated between the roles of these 
networks on the extensive and intensive margins.  The present paper does so using a model with 
fixed effects, finding that ethnic networks increase trade on the intensive margin but not on the 
extensive margin. 
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1. Introduction 
 Following Rauch (1999 and 2001), a literature has developed that looks at the effect of 
information networks on international trade.  To date, empirical research on this question has not 
distinguished between the extensive margin (whether trade occurs) and intensive margins (the 
level of trade, given that trade already occurs).  Typically, studies pool together observations of 
zero and positive trade into a single cross-section, thereby treating changes in two positive levels 
of trade the same as a change between not trading and trading.  There is no reason to believe, 
however, that the effect of information networks on overcoming entry barriers would be the 
same as on expanding existing trading relationships.  One might expect that information barriers 
are higher in markets in which a country’s firms do not already have a presence, and, thus, that 
an information network would be more helpful on the extensive margin.  On the other hand, 
because information is only one of many entry barriers in overseas markets, an information 
network might not be a particularly effective advantage in gaining entry into a market.  The 
contribution of this paper is to examine the extensive and intensive margins separately and to 
show the different effects that information networks have on them. 
 The empirical application of the information-networks literature has focused on the role 
of ethnic networks.  Because of data availability and comparability, much of the recent work has 
looked at the relationship between a U.S. state’s exports and the state’s number of foreign-born 
residents, finding ethnic-network elasticities ranging between 0.18 and 0.37 [Co, Euzent, and 
Martin, 2004; Dunlevy, 2006; and Herander and Saavedra, 2005].  All of the studies using U.S. 
state exports—and nearly all those that use country-to-country trade data—use a standard gravity 
model with a cross-section of data.  As shown by Cheng and Wall (2005), however, such gravity 
models tend to be biased because of unobserved or incorrectly specified heterogeneity.  In the 
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context of ethnic networks, such bias can arise if there are, say, historical reasons for a high 
volume of trade between a state and a country as well as for a large number of migrants from the 
country to the state.  It might also be that the measures of distance used in standard gravity 
models are biased measures of the distance-related costs of trade.   
 To remedy these problems, Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008) constructed a 
two-year panel of state exports to show that when the estimation controls for country-state fixed 
effects, the estimate of the ethnic-network elasticity falls by nearly half (from 0.27 to 0.14).  This 
panel approach also allows for an examination of states entering overseas markets to see whether 
there is a relationship between entry into a market and an increase in the number of the state’s 
residents who were born in that country.  We exploit this feature below and use a fixed-effects 
logit to estimate the extensive margin of ethnic networks and to use OLS with fixed effects to 
estimate the intensive margin separately.   
 
2. Estimation Alternatives 
 Our export data are from WISER for 1990 and 2000 and cover manufacturing exports 
from 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded) to 29 countries in 19 SIC industries.
1
  We 
consider all industry-country combinations for which exports were positive for at least one of the 
years, yielding 47,776 observations.  Data on the number of foreign-born residents from each 
country in each state are from the decennial census.  A conventional fixed-effects gravity model 
estimating the link between Fsct, the number of residents in state s at time t born in country c, and 
xscit, real exports from s to c of goods in industry i at time t, might look like 
 
                                                 
1
 The countries and industries are listed in the appendix. 
ln(1 ) ln ln ln ,scit sc c st ct st ct sct scitx Y Y N N F              (1) 
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where Yit and Nit (i = s,c) are real income and population, respectively.  Here, the state-country 
intercept term αsc controls for all variables that are constant over time and specific to the state 
and country pair, including distance.  We also include a country-specific trend variable, τc, to 
control for changes in the level of import protection in each of the export markets.  As is 
commonly (although not necessarily correctly) done to avoid taking the log of zero, we add 1 to 
every observation for the sake of comparison. 
 Alternatively, instead of combining the extensive and intensive margins, as in (1), we 
split the estimation into two parts: (1) the probability of entrance into or exit from a market and 
(2) the importance of ethnic networks in increasing exports to an already-served market.  Our 
estimation of the extensive margin is 
 
which is conditional on there being at least one entry or exit across the 19 industries for a state-
country pair.
2
    
 We estimate the intensive margin with 
 
for which xscit is positive for both years.  Note that, for consistency with the combined estimation, 
we have maintained the convention of adding 1 to every export observation even though we do 
not have any observations of zero exports.  This has a very minor quantitative effect on the 
ethnic-network elasticity, which would be unchanged to the fifth decimal place if we dropped 
this convention. 
 
                                                 
2
 We should note the tendency for changes on this margin to be between smaller states and countries, and that these 
state-country pairs are also less likely to have traded in either period. 
ln(1 ) ln ln ln ,scit sc c st ct st ct sct scitx Y Y N N F              
(3) 
Pr( 0) ln ln ln ,scit sc c st ct st ct sct scitx Y Y N N F              
(2) 
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3. Results 
 As summarized in Table 1, estimation of (1) yields an ethnic-network elasticity of 0.192, 
which is in line with previous estimates.  When we split the estimation into equations (2) and (3), 
however, the ethnic-network elasticity on the extensive margin is not statistically different from 
zero; but, the elasticity on the intensive margin is a statistically significant 0.139.  In other words, 
we find that ethnic networks are associated with increased exports when a trading relationship 
already exists, but we find no association between ethnic networks and entry into an export 
market.   
 In a Melitz-type model of heterogeneous firms, such as Lawless (2010), a reduction in 
information costs is more likely to have an effect on the extensive margin, suggesting the 
opposite of our results.  On the other hand, our results make more sense if we also consider 
exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) as substitute strategies.3   Specifically, assume that 
for every firm a larger ethnic network reduces the cost of becoming an exporter or of engaging in 
FDI.  In such a scenario, some firms (and their states) will become exporters, others will switch 
from exporting to FDI, while others will switch to FDI from doing neither.  On average, 
therefore, the effect on the intensive margin is ambiguous, although those states that do export 
will be exporting more. 
 It is worth pointing out the role that fixed effects have on our results, so we have also 
estimated (1) – (3) under the assumptions that all state-country pairs have the same non-distance-
related intercept.  These estimates include explicitly the distance between the states’ and 
countries’ largest cities, along with a dummy to indicate whether the state and country are  
contiguous.  As summarized by Table 2 and consistent with Bandyopadhay, Coughlin, and Wall 
(2008), estimation without fixed effects yields larger estimates of the ethnic-network elasticity:  
                                                 
3
 Greenaway and Kneller (2007) survey this literature. 
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for the combined estimation, 0.335; on the extensive margin, 0.225; and on the intensive margin, 
0.168.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 A well-known empirical finding is that ethnic networks increase international trade flows 
by helping to reduce information barriers.  Using data on U.S. state exports, we find that the 
effects differ on the intensive and extensive margins.  When state-country fixed effects are 
included, the ethnic-network elasticity of trade on the intensive margin is positive and 
significant, but is statistically no different from zero on the extensive margin.  In contrast, when 
fixed effects are not included, the effect is significant on both margins and is one-third higher on 
the extensive margin.    
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Appendix 
 
29 Destination Countries  
Argentina   
Australia   
Brazil   
Canada   
Chile   
China   
Colombia   
Egypt   
France   
Germany   
Hong Kong   
India   
Indonesia   
Ireland   
Israel   
Italy   
Japan   
Malaysia   
Mexico   
Netherlands   
Philippines   
South Africa   
South Korea   
Spain   
Sweden   
Thailand   
Turkey   
United Kingdom   
Venezuela   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 SIC Industries 
Food and Kindred Products 
Textile Mill Products 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Paper and Allied Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products 
Leather and Leather Products 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 
Primary Metal Industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Industrial Machinery, Computer Equipment 
Electronic, Electric Equip, Exc. Computers 
Transportation Equipment 
Instruments and Related Products 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries 
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Table 1. Estimation with State-Country Fixed Effects 
 Combined Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
 Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  
State-Country Fixed 
Effects (incl. Distance) 
yes    yes     yes     
ln YiYj  0.814  0.590 1.38 1.267 † 0.662 1.91  1.433 * 0.383 3.74  
ln NiNj  2.128 * 0.771 2.76 0.889 0.906 0.98  -0.264  0.497 -0.53  
ln Fij  0.192 † 0.098 1.95  0.002  0.097 0.02  0.139 * 0.061 2.27  
Log-likelihood -127,550.8 -7,449.6 -87,665.6 
R
2
 0.402 - 0.400 
Number of Observations 47,776 30,824 40,480 
State-Country Pairs 1,391 942 1,385 
All standard errors are robust.  Statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted by * and †, 
respectively.  Country-specific time dummies are included in the estimation but, due to space constraints, are not 
reported. 
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Table 2. Pooled Cross-Section Estimation 
 Combined Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
 Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  Coeff. S.E. t-stat.  
ln Distanceij -1.163 * 0.059 -19.75 -0.882 * 0.127 -6.96  -0.731 * 0.040 -18.22  
Contiguityij 0.195 † 0.108 1.81 0.240  1.145 0.21  0.411 * 0.095 4.32  
ln YiYj  1.871 * 0.043 43.81 1.088 * 0.048 22.55  0.931 * 0.026 35.16  
ln NiNj  -0.455 * 0.044 -10.42 -0.354 * 0.044 -8.09  0.010  0.026 0.39  
ln Fij  0.335 * 0.020 17.16  0.225 * 0.023 9.91  0.168 * 0.013 13.44  
Log-likelihood -129,604.6 -9,713.3 (pseudo) -89,527.1 
R
2 
0.348 0.246 (pseudo) 0.342 
Number of Observations 47,776 47,776 40,480 
All standard errors are robust.  Statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted by * and †, 
respectively.  Country-specific time dummies are included in the estimation but, due to space constraints, are not 
reported. 
 
